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Abstract
At the end of 1982, Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) withdrew from its Libyan oil exploration
and production concessions. Subsequently, Mobil filed an arbitration claim against the Libyan
Government, alleging that government action had effectively destroyed the economic value of
Mobil’s concession. This arbitration raises substantial questions of transnational contract law.
Part I of this Note provides the factual background to the Mobil-Libya dispute and a review of the
major issues involved. Part II discusses the right of a host government to set export prices. Part
III considers whether a host government may take unilateral action even though the concession
agreement includes a stabilization clause. Part IV examines the issue of “creeping expropriation.”
Part V analyzes the effect of the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources on the
issues raised by the Mobil-Libya dispute. The Note concludes that when an oil concessionaire
continues to operate in the host state for an extended period following the host government’s
alleged breach of contract, the concessionaire should be held to have effectively waived its claims
for breach of the concession agreement.
UNILATERAL ACTION BY OIL-PRODUCING
COUNTRIES: POSSIBLE CONTRACTUAL
REMEDIES OF FOREIGN PETROLEUM
COMPANIES
INTRODUCTION
At the end of 1982, Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil)' with-
drew from its Libyan oil exploration and production conces-
sions.2 Subsequently, Mobil filed an arbitration claim against
the Libyan Government, alleging that government action had
effectively destroyed the economic value of Mobil's conces-
sion.3 This arbitration4 raises substantial questions of transna-
1. Mobil Oil Corp. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mobil Corp., a Delaware cor-
poration formed in 1976 to serve as a holding company for the oil and energy inter-
ests of Mobil Oil Corp., as well as such other subsidiaries as Montgomery Ward &
Co., Inc., and Container Corp. of America. MOBIL CORP., SEC FORM 10-K I (fiscal
year ending Dec. 31, 1980). Mobil Oil Corp. was originally incorporated in 1882.
MOBIL OIL CORP., SEC FORM 10-K I (fiscal year ending Dec. 31, 1980). Mobil Oil
Corp. was part of the Standard Oil Company trust, which was dismantled as a result
of government antitrust action in 1911. F. WADDAMS, THE LIBYAN OIL INDUSTRY 31-
32 (1980). As of the end of 1984, Mobil was the United States' fourth largest corpo-
ration, with assets of U.S.$41.8 billion, more than U.S.$60 billion in annual sales
revenue and net income of U.S.$1.3 billion. Bus. WK., Mar. 22, 1985, at 42-43, 107
(special annual report issue). Mobil carried out its operations in Libya through a
wholly owned subsidiary, Mobil Oil Libya Ltd.
2. Mufson, Mobil Pulls Out Fron Libyan Oil Fields, Saving Terms of 1955 Pact lWere
Violated, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at 2, col. 3; MOBIL. CORP., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 6
(1983).
3. MOBIL CORP., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. Mobil's claim was
referred to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in Mobil's concession agree-
ments. See Ibrahim, Libya Warns Mobil to Drop Claims or Face an Audit, Wall St. J., Sep.
26, 1984, at 42, col. 3. The arbitration clause provides that:
If at any time during or after the currency of this Concession any doubt,
difference or dispute shall arise between the Commission [i.e., the Govern-
ment] and the Company concerning the interpretation or performance
hereof, or anything herein contained or in connection herewith, or the
rights and liabilities of either party hereunder or if the parties should fail to
agree upon any matter required to be settled by agreement, the same shall,
failing any agreement to settle it any other way, be referred to . . . Arbitra-
tors.
Royal Decree Amending Certain Provisions of the Petroleum Law No. 25 of 1955,
Eng. trans. at 27 (July 3, 1961) [hereinafter cited as "1961 Amendments"] (available at
the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal). Some months after the referral to
arbitration, Libya asserted that Mobil owed the government U.S.$1 10 million in un-
paid taxes and equity payments, but offered to withdraw this claim if Mobil withdrew
its arbitration claim and agreed to fulfill the balance of the company's commitments
under the concession agreement. Ibrahim, Libya ll'arns Vobil to Drop Claims or Face an
Audit, Wall St.J., Sept. 26, 1984, at 42, col. 3. No award in the arbitration had been
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tional contract law. The issues raised by the Libya-Mobil dis-
pute, concerning the right of a host state5 to change unilater-
ally the terms of agreements with foreign investors, extend far
beyond the specific dispute in Libya. Such contract changes by
host governments occur frequently in the mining and oil in-
dustries6 and in other foreign-investment situations. Despite
the frequency of these unilateral contract changes, the existing
international legal framework offers no clear guidelines for de-
termining the validity of such alterations, especially when the
contractual regime regulating the investment contains a stabili-
zation provision,7 or provides for determining an investor's
remedies if the changes are invalid. 8
A number of international arbitration cases have dealt
with oil concessions in developing countries. 9 Most of these
reported as of Dec. 31, 1985. See Feder, Libya Trade Was Low Before Ban, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 8, 1986, at A7, col. 1, at col. 5.
4. Libya has been the defendant in three previous arbitration cases. These cases
are reported as Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Government of the Libyan
Arab Republic, 62 I.L.R. 141 (1977) (Mahmassani, Arb.) [hereinafter cited as
"LIAMCO Arbitration"]; BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Government of the Libyan
Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1974) (Lagergren, Arb.) [hereinafter cited as "B.P.
Arbitration"]; and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. and California Asiatic Oil Co. v.
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389 (1977) (Dupuy, Arb.) [here-
inafter cited as "TOPCOArbitration"]. For descriptions of the situations that gave rise
to these arbitrations and of the decisions rendered, see Fatouros, International Law
and the Internationalized Contract, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 134 (1980); Von Mehren & Kou-
rides, The Libyan Nationalization Cases, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 476 (1981).
5. Any state receiving foreign investment is typically classified as a "host" state.
See, e.g., J. Kuusi, THE HOST STATE AND THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION Xi (1979).
6. See generally T. MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF
DEPENDENCE: COPPER IN CHILE 153-69 (1974) (readjustment of contractual terms
that typically occurs in the case of developing-country mining concessions); S.
ASANTE, TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 40-42 (Ad-
dress to Commonwealth Secretariat-United Nations Centre on Transnational Corpo-
rations Workshop on Mining Legislations and Negotiation of Resources Agreements,
Gaborone, Botswana, Oct. 9-13, 1978) (available at the offices of the Fordhan Interna-
tional LawJonrnal). Recent changes in contractual arrangements in the oil industry
are discussed in the text infra accompanying notes 26-43. For pre-1970 changes, see
From Concession to Contract (pts. I & 2), 41 PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 459 (Dec. 1974); 42
PETROLEUM ECONOMIST 21 (Jan. 1975).
7. For discussion of stabilization clauses and their effects, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 131-4 1.
8. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 515-19 (2d ed.
1976).
9. See snpra note 4 (citing cases concerning oil concessions in developing coun-
tries); see, e.g., Government of the State of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Co.,
21 I.L.M. 976 (1982) (Reuter, Sultan & Fitzmaurice, Arbs.) [hereinafter cited as "Ami-
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cases have concerned either de jure or de facto nationaliza-
tions of concessionaires' operations.1 0 The Mobil-Libya dis-
pute, in contrast, did not arise as a result of a formal nationali-
zation. Mobil, however, claimed that unilateral actions of the
Libyan Government amounted to a material breach of the cor-
poration's concession agreements, and that this breach justi-
fied an award of damages and entitled Mobil to withdraw from
any further performance of its obligations under the conces-
sions, even though Mobil had continued to operate in Libya
for seven years following the government's unilateral actions."
While Mobil publicly presented its case against the Libyan
Government in terms of breach of contract, '2 the facts underly-
ing the dispute can also be seen as an example of what is some-
times called "creeping expropriation." This is a process in
which a host government, through regulatory or fiscal meas-
ures, gradually reduces the profitability of a foreigner's invest-
ment to such a degree that the state can be said to have taken
the property. 13
The Mobil-Libya dispute raises issues that apply to the ac-
tions of many oil- and mineral-producing Third World states. 14
Many of these states have been among the principal advocates
of the "New International Economic Order"' 5 (NIEO) and
noil Arbitration"]; Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co.,
35 I.L.R. 136 (1963) (Cavin Arb.); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117 (1958) (Sauser-Hall, Ref., Badawi/Hassan and Habachy,
Arbs.); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.CJ. 93 (Preliminary Objec-
tion); Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (1951)
(Lord Asquith of Bishopstone, Ump.).
10. See, e.g., supra note 4 (citing cases concerning oil concessions in developing
countries); AminoilArbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K.
v. Iran), 1952 I.CJ. 93 (all involving nationalization issues).
11. See Mufson, Mobil Pulls Out From Libyan Oil Fields, Saying Terms of 1955 Pact
Jl'ere Violated, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
12. Id.
13. For a more detailed discussion of "creeping expropriation," see in/ra text
accompanying notes 165-73.
14. For a discussion of actions by petroleum-producing states during the 1970s,
see H. ZAKARIYA, STATE SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES IN ACTION 5-8 (Jan.
23, 1981) (unpublished report prepared for submission to the seventh session of the
United Nations Committee on Natural Resources) (available at the offices of the Ford-
ham International Law Journal). Earlier developments are reported in Permanent Sov-
ereignty Over Natural Resources: Report of the Secretary-General 3-5, U.N. Doc.
E/C.7/53 (1975) and Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources: Report of the
Secretary-General 4-9, U.N. Doc. A/9716 (1974).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 183-85.
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"permanent sovereignty over natural resources,"'" a principle,
reflected in numerous international declarations, 17 that em-
phasizes a host state's right to regulate and control the ex-
ploitation of its natural wealth. Any widely publicized arbitral
decision, in a case like the Mobil-Libya dispute, that appears to
set limits on host states' rights to tax resource-exploiting for-
eign companies would represent, to these states, a severe limi-
tation on their sovereignty.'"
This Note will analyze three related issues raised by the
Mobil-Libya dispute: 1) the right of host states to set prices
unilaterally for their commodity exports, even when the com-
modities are produced and sold by foreign investors operating
under concession agreements;' 9 2) the permissible extent of
unilateral host-government fiscal measures, such as changes in
tax or royalty rates, which affect natural-resource concession-
aires;' ° and 3) the boundary between permissible regulation of
foreign investment and impermissible "creeping expropria-
tion. 1 21
Part I of this Note provides the factual background to the
Mobil-Libya dispute and a review of the major issues involved.
Part II discusses the right of a host government to set export
prices. Part III considers whether a host government may take
unilateral action even though the concession agreement in-
cludes a stabilization clause. Part IV examines the issue of
"creeping expropriation." Part V analyzes the effect of the
doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources on
the issues raised by the Mobil-Libya dispute. The Note con-
cludes that when an oil concessionaire continues to operate in
the host state for an extended period following the host gov-
16. See infra text accompanying notes 178-82.
17. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (1962) (Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources); G.A. Res. 3171, 28
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9400 (1973) (Permanent Sovereignty
Over Natural Resources); G.A. Res. 3201, S-6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I) at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/9559 (1974) (New International Economic Order); G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States).
18. On the precedential effect of arbitral decisions and investor uncertainty as to
their application, see Caldwell, Selected Clauses in Transnational Contracts § 4.08(5), in
THF LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BusINESs TRANSACTIONS (V. Nanda ed. 1985).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 108-30.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 131-34.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 165-74.
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ernment's alleged breach of contract, the concessionaire
should be held to have effectively waived its claims for breach
of the concession agreement.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE
A. The History of Oil Concession Agreements
Before 1960, host governments in the oil-producing de-
veloping countries played a passive role, exercising little or no
control over the actions of concessionaires. 22 During this pe-
riod, host governments had virtually no influence in determin-
ing the prices of their oil exports 23 and received only modest
financial returns from the oil produced in their territory.24
A growing awareness in developing countries of the ineq-
uities of the traditional concession system 25 led to some
22. See U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT 3, U.N. Sales No. E.82.II.A.22 (1982). For gen-
eral descriptions of the history of oil concession agreements, see, e.g., H. CATrAN,
THE EVOLUTION OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (1967);
J. HARTSHORN, OIL COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL OIL INDUSTRY IN ITS SALIENT ENVIRONMENT (1962); K. HOSSAIN, LAW AND POL-
ICY IN PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT 1-12 (1979); S. LONGRIGG, OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
ITS DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT (1968); Z. MIKDASHI, A FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF
MIDDLE EASTERN OIL CONCESSIONS, 1901-65 (1966); E. PENROSE, THE LARGE INTER-
NATIONAL FIRM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1968); G.
STOCKING, MIDDLE EAST OIL (1970); L. TURNER, OIL COMPANIES IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SYSTEM (1978).
Many of the concessions, especially in the Persian Gulf and Africa, were origi-
nally granted for periods extending into the 21st century. See When Do the Concessions
End?, PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 1971, at 449. In Libya, most of the conces-
sions, including Mobil's, were due to end in the year 2011. Id.
23. H. CATrAN, supra note 22, at 3; Howarth, Twenty-Three Years of Oil, PETROLEUM
PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 1973, at 22.
24. Howarth, supra note 23, at 22.
25. See K. HOSSAIN, supra note 22, at 13. Among the issues which were consid-
ered by the oil-producing states to be problem areas under the concession system
were the following:
(a) long duration of concessions;
(b) absence of relinquishment provisions or, where such provisions existed,
failure by the concessionaires to comply with their requirements;
(c) suspension of governmental rights to tax;
(d) discretion given to concessionaires to determine the pace of exploration
and to decide what areas should be developed and for how long areas
should lie idle;
(e) retention of managerial decisions exclusively in the hands of foreigners;
(f) flaring (burning-off) of natural gas and failure to reinject gas into reser-
voirs (to provide for greater ultimate recovery);
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changes in the 1950s and 1960s.2'  The principal develop-
ments included formation of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC)27 and the introduction of new
forms of petroleum exploration and production agreements,
notably the production-sharing contracts pioneered by Indo-
nesia 2 and the use ofjoint ventures, in which the host govern-
ment participated both as an equity partner and as a tax collec-
tor. 29 Further changes in the pattern of relations between the
oil companies and host governments were made by the Te-
hran, Tripoli and Geneva agreements of 1970-1973, 30 in which
(g) arbitrary pricing policies; and
(h) adoption of accounting methods and procedures that had the effect of
reducing the government "take."
Id. at 15; see also G. STOCKING, supra note 22, at 130-37.
26. See K. HOSSAIN, supra note 22, at 15-19; A. SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS:
THE GREAT OIL COMPANIES AND THE WORLD THEY SHAPED 108-12 (1975).
27. The immediate stimulus for the formation of OPEC was a reduction in
posted prices by the major oil companies in 1960. See P. TERZIAN, OPEC: THE INSIDE
STORY 32-45 (1985); see also K. HOSSAIN, supra note 22, at 16. For general discussion
of the role of OPEC, see M. AL-OTAIBA, OPEC AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1975);
Z. MIKDASHI, THE COMMUNITY OF OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES (1972).
28. Under production-sharing contracts, the host state retained title to the oil
and the production facilities; the foreign investor provided the capital and technol-
ogy and was entitled to a share of the oil produced to repay the investment costs,
plus a share of the "profit oil" remaining after costs had been paid. For a description
of the Indonesian production-sharing agreements, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., A STUDY OF THE RELATION-
SHIPS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN SELECTED FOR-
EIGN COUNTRIES: INDONESIA 7-10 (Comm. Print 1975) (Congressional Research Ser-
vice Report); Fabrikant, Production Sharng Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industly,
16 HARV. INT'L LJ. 303, 310-33 (1975).
29. See U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 22, at 4. In
joint ventures, the foreign investor and the host government or its state oil company
each owned a portion of the equity and each was responsible for financing its share of
costs. The first joint venture agreements were negotiated by the Italian state oil com-
pany, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) in Iran in 1957. A. SAMPSON, snpra note 26,
at 149.
30. The text of the Tehran Agreement relating to Persian Gulf oil prices is re-
printed in PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Feb. 22, 1971, at Supp. 1. The text of
the Geneva agreement modifying the Tehran agreement to take account of currency
fluctuations is in PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Jan. 31, 1972, at 5. The Tripoli
agreement relating to Libyan prices is in PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Apr. 12,
1971 at 9 [hereinafter cited as "Tripoli Agreement"], and a supplemental agreement
concerning currency fluctuations that affected Libyan prices is in PETROLEUM INTELLI-
GENCE WEEKLY, May 29, 1972, at 7. The negotiations surrounding these agreements
are described in P. TERZIAN, supra note 27, at 112-53; F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at
236-45 and in Tough Bargaining in Tripoli, PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 1971, at
122. For an industry view of the agreements as a basis for future price stability, see
Billion-Dollar Package, PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 1971, at 82.
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the transnational3' corporations for the first time recognized a
role for host governments in the process of setting oil prices.
The Arab-Israeli war of October, 1973, and the OPEC
states' assumption of control over oil prices in 1973-1974 33
produced even greater changes. Specifically, many host gov-
ernments assumed full authority to determine the oil prices
used for assessing the oil companies' taxable income3 4 and re-
quired concessionaires to cede to them a share in equity partic-
ipation in the concessions." In Libya, these changes were re-
flected in the adoption of Libyan Arab Republic Revolutionary
Command Council Law No. 82 of 1973 Amending Certain
Provisions of the Petroleum Law No. 25 of 1955 (Law No.
82).36 These amendments gave the Ministry of Petroleum Af-
fairs the right to determine oil prices. 7
31. The term "transnational" has been increasingly used in recent years in place
of "multinational" or "international" when referring to activities carried out across
national frontiers. Transnational corporations are business organizations compris-
ing several legal entities that operate in more than one country and are linked to-
gether by a controlling parent corporation. J. Kuusi, supra note 5, at 25; see also H.
STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 8, at xv.
32. See M. TANZER, THE ENERGY CRISIS: WORLD STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND
WEALTH 125 (1974). Most oil produced in OPEC states was, as late as 1972, sold to
affiliates within the vertically integrated structures of the transnational oil companies.
Tanzer & Zorn, OPEC's Decade: Has It Made a Difference?, 36 MONTHLY REV. 31, 35
(May 1984). Therefore the reported sales prices for oil were largely within the dis-
cretion of the companies; profits could be realized at any stage from crude oil pro-
duction to consumer product marketing. See S. GHANEM, THE PRICING OF LIBYAN
CRUDE OIL 43 (1975). From the point of view of the producer governments, the
relevant price was the "posted price" for crude oil, on which the calculation of royal-
ties and taxes was based. Id. at 26-27. In Libya and elsewhere, this posted price was
originally determined by the oil companies themselves, which then notified the host
governments of their determination. Id.
33. See generally P. TERZIAN, supra note 27, at 163-87; A. SAMPSON, supra note 26,
at 249-59; N. JACOBY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 257 (1974). On the use of oil-supply boy-
cotts by the producing states in response to the 1973 war and as a device for support-
ing price increases, see October Revolution, PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE, Nov., 1973, at
402.
34. See K. HOSSAIN, supra note 22, at 21.
35. Id.
36. Libyan Arab Republic Revolutionary Command Council Law No. 82 of 1973
Amending Certain Provisions of the Petroleum Law No. 25 of 1955 [hereinafter cited
as "Law N\o. 82"] (English translation available at the offices of the Fordian) Interna-
tional Law Journal).
37. Law No. 82 added the following paragraph to every oil concession agree-
ment then in force in Libya:
The Minister of Petroleum may, in the event of change in circumstances or
basis of determining the prices of crude oil or derivatives thereof in the mar-
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In addition to imposing new pricing rules, the Libyan
Government also negotiated new agreements with the conces-
sionaires between 1972 and 1975. Under these new agree-
ments, the companies each sold the government 51% interests
in their respective operations.3 8  This new situation was ac-
cepted by the major transnational oil corporations in the
OPEC states generally,39 as well as specifically in Libya. 40 By
1975, for example, all the concessionaires operating in Libya
had signed participation agreements. 4' By virtue of these
agreements and Law No. 82, the government obtained a ma-
jority equity interest in the oil concessions4 2 and the right to
determine export prices unilaterally for purposes of royalty
and tax calculations.43
By the mid-1970s, a new pattern of relations between
OPEC host governments and transnational corporations had
been established. 44 The governments, rather than the oil com-
panies, took primary responsibility for determining basic is-
sues such as how much oil to produce, and at what price it
ket, determine the prices of crude oil and its derivatives by a decision there-
from in which he takes into account market conditions and the superior
qualities of Libyan crude oil .. .provided that computation of the income
realized by the concession holder from sale of crude oil or derivatives
thereof shall be made in accordance with the prices determined in the deci-
sion of the Minister of Petroleum.
Law No. 82, spra note 36, at 1.
38. For a discussion of the process by which the Libyan Government acquired its
51% interest, see F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 254-60. The participation agreement
with Mobil was concluded on Apr. 16, 1974. See Participation Agreement Between
the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic and the National Oil Corporation and
Mobil Oil Libya Ltd., Apr. 16, 1974 [hereinafter cited as "1974 Participation Agree-
went"] (available at the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal). The Mobil
participation agreement followed an earlier acquisition of 51% ownership by the Lib-
yan government in Occidental's Libyan operations. See Text of Libyan Decree Nationaliz-
ing Occidental, PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Aug. 20, 1973, at 8-9.
39. See, e.g., U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MAIN FEATURES
AND TRENDS IN PETROLEUM AND MINING AGREEMENTS 6-7, U.N. Sales No. E.83.II.A.9
(1983).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 96-99.
41. See F. WADDAMS, snpra note 1, at 259.
42. 1974 Participation Agreement, supra note 38, at 3.
43. See Law No. 82, snpra note 36.
44. See K. HOSSAIN, supra note 22, at 38-41. One of the oil companies' responses
to these changed conditions was to diversify their operations away from OPEC states
and to obtain increased profits at other stages of the industry than crude oil produc-
tion. Id.
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should be sold.4 5 It is within this new pattern that the facts of
the Mobil-Libya dispute should be analyzed.
B. Principal Issues in Contract Disputes
As host governments have taken a more active role in the
international oil industry, a number of issues have emerged as
recurrent sources of controversy between these governments
and the transnational oil companies.46 The effects of three of
these issues, 1) the choice-of-law clause, 2) stabilization
clauses, and 3) a company's de facto acquiescence to unilateral
government conduct, are particularly relevant to the Mobil-
Libya dispute.
1. Choice of Law
Within broad limits, contracting parties are free to choose
the law that will govern their agreement.47 From the point of
45. See, e.g., P. TERZIAN, supra note 27, at 112-45 (discussion of OPEC states'
efforts to establish control over pricing); see also U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, supra note 39, at 27-51 (reflecting post-1973 contractual practice
outside the OPEC states).
46. All of these issues arise from a characterization of petroleum concession
agreements as essentially contractual in nature. While the precise status of such
agreements is a matter of some controversy, see White, Expropriation of the Libyan Oil
Concessions-Two Conflicting InternationalArbitrations, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 5 (1981),
most of the prior decisions are unequivocal in their characterization of concession
agreements as bilateral contracts. See, e.g., Aminoil Arbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1001
(1982); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117, 164
(1958); and Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), [1952] I.C.J. 93, 111-12. Simi-
lar conclusions as to the basically contractual nature of oil concession agreements
were reached in the previous Libyan arbitrations. LIAMCO Arbitration, 62 I.L.R. 141,
169-70 (1977); TOPCO Arbitration, 53 I.L.R. 389, 440 (1977) (quoting M. Cohen-
Jonathan, Les Concessions en Droit International Public 133-34 (1966). (unpublished
thesis)); B.P. Arbitration, 53 I.L.R. 297, 327 (1974); see also Mann, The Theoretical Ap-
proach Towards the Law Governing Contracts Between States and Private Persons, 11 REVUE
BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 562, 564 (1975).
47. TOPCO Arbitration, 53 I.L.R. 389, 442 (1977). A preliminary question in
most of the petroleum arbitrations is which conflict of laws rules the arbitrator should
apply in determining the substantive law that governs the dispute. There are two
possible approaches. First, the arbitrator could look to the conflict of laws rules in
force at the seat of the tribunal. Alternatively, an arbitrator could apply the conflict
of laws rules that he or she deems appropriate, without any necessary regard to the
site of the arbitration, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, so as to give
effect to the will of the parties. See B.P. Arbitration, 53 I.L.R. 297, 326 (1974) (choos-
ing Danish choice of law rules as most appropriate). Either approach will normally
result in the application of the substantive law chosen by the parties, if they have
made such a choice. When, however, a party fails to participate in the arbitration
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view of developing countries the preferred choice of law clause
is one which provides that all disputes are to be settled in ac-
cordance with the law of the host state.48 Other governments,
particularly in the early years of oil exploration on their terri-
tory, have sometimes agreed to choice of law clauses that ap-
plied the law of the investor's home jurisdiction."' More typi-
cally, however, major natural-resource agreements provide for
some wholly or partially internationalized choice of law.50 One
typical formulation applies the law of the host state generally,
but provides that international law shall apply whenever there
is a gap in the host state's legislation.5' Another form of inter-
nationalization, less favorable to developing countries, applies
international law or "general principles of law" whenever that
law conflicts with the law of the host state.52 This is the choice
proceeding, the resulting choice of law and procedural determinations may seem
somewhat arbitrary. For example, in the Libyan concessions, if one party fails to
cooperate in choosing arbitrators, the choice will be made by the President of the
International Court ofJustice, and the chosen arbitrator will then select the choice of
law and procedural rules. See White, supra note 46, at 8 n.34.
48. See Walde, Negotiating for Dispute Settlement in Transnational .Mlineral Contracts:
Current Practice, Trends and an Evaluation from the Host Country s Perspective, 7 DENVER J.
INT'L L. & POL. 33, 47 (1977). This preference for domestic (municipal) law is likely
to be increased as a result of recent decisions awarding substantial damages. See
White, supra note 46, at 18. Examples of contracts that include such clauses are given
in A. Sahakian, Contracts and Agreements in the International Petroleum Industry
61 (unpublished report to U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, Jan., 1981)
(available at the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal). The original Libyan
concession agreements, signed in 1955, provided that the governing law was to be
"the laws of Libya and such principles and rules of international law as may be rele-
vant." F. WADDAMS, supra note i, at 106. This emphasis on domestic law as rein-
forced by the 1961 amendment to the Petroleum Law, which added the phrase, "but
only to the extent that such rules and principles are not inconsistent with and do not
conflict with the laws of Libya." Id. This situation was reversed by the 1966 amend-
ments. See infra text accompanying note 90.
49. See, e.g., Kuwayt Oil Co. Concessionary Agreement, Dec. 23, 1934, art. 18
(specifying arbitration in London) and art. 21 (making the English text definitive)
(available at the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal).
50. See Walde, supra note 48, at 48. For a clear statement of international law as
the governing law of the concession, see Revised Agreement: Persia and the Anglo-
Persian Oil Co., Apr. 29, 1933, art. 22(F) (referring to art. 38 of the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice as defining the governing law of the conces-
sion) (available at the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal).
51. The Libyan arbitration clause negotiated in 1963 was of this type. See
Amendment to Concession Agreement (Sep. 28, 1963) [hereinafter cited as -1963
Agreement"] (available at the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal).
52. See TOPCO Arbitration, 53 I.L.R. 389, 441-62 (1977).
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of law rule adopted in the Libyan oil concession agreements. 5 3
2. Stabilization Clauses
Foreign investors have traditionally attempted to prevent
host governments from making unilateral changes that would
adversely affect the investors' profitability. 54 The usual form
taken by these attempts is a clause that purports to bar any
changes in the contractor's rights that may be made by the
government without the investor's consent.5 5 While the legal
impact of such clauses, at least within the host state's own ju-
risdiction, is questionable,56 the clauses may nonetheless pro-
vide a basis for compensation or damage claims when a con-
tract has been internationalized.5 7 In addition, many foreign
investors seek such clauses as a means of reinforcing the par-
ties' stated intention not to change the agreement without mu-
tual consent. 58
Stabilization clauses have traditionally been included in
many of the major oil-producing states' agreements. 5  The
language used in these clauses in Libya 60 is fairly typical of
53. See infra text accompanying note 90 for text of the choice of law clause in its
most recent Libyan version. The fact that international law governs the agreement,
however, may not necessarily determine the outcome of any particular dispute in
which the international law rules themselves are uncertain or ambiguous.
54. See Asante, Stability of Contractual Relations in the Transnational Investment Process,
28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q 401, 404 (1979).
55. Id. at 409. For an example of such a clause, see infra text accompanying note
82 (discussion of the Libyan stabilization clause).
56. See Zakariya, Changed Circumstances and the Continued Validity, of .ineral Develop-
ment Contracts, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 263
(K. Hossain ed. 1980); see also F. Hyndrex, A Sovereign Nation's Legal Ability to
Make and Abide by a Petroleum Concession Contract 7 (paper presented at the First
Arab Petroleum Congress, Cairo, April, 1959) (arguing that no government can bind
its successors not to alter a previous contract) (available at the office of the Fordham
International Law Journal).
57. See, e.g., the importance attached to the stabilization clause in the Aniinoil
Arbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1023 (1982). Stabilization clauses typically protect the in-
vestor against (a) tax increases; (b) the imposition of other fiscal charges;
(c) amendments to laws affecting the concessionaire's operations; and
(d) expropriation, nationalization and other forms of government intervention in the
enterprise. Asante, supra note 54, at 409.
58. See id. at 409-10; see also Moran, Transnational Strategies of Protection and Defense
by Multinational Coiporations: Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost of Nationalization in
Natural Resources, 27 INT'L ORG. 273 (1973).
59. See U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 22, at 41.
60. Kingdom of Libya, Ministry of Petroleum Affairs, Agreement for Amend-
ment of Petroleum Concessions Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 50, 57, 62, 72, at 22
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contracts in force in the 1960s and early 1970s."' Notwith-
standing the wide acceptance of stabilization clauses, major
changes have in fact occurred in the relations between host
governments and transnational oil companies. 6 ' Among the
more dramatic changes were the rapid price increases of 1973-
1974, despite the five-year price stability guarantee of the 1971
Tehran and Tripoli agreements, 63 and the producer govern-
ments' rapid acquisition of majority or even 100% equity own-
ership of the concessions, despite agreements that purported
to phase in such equity participation over ten years. 6 4 Most
such changes reduced the companies' share of profits, 6"5 and
not all the changes were accepted willingly."" The stabilization
clause mechanism is not by itself'an effective device for achiev-
ing actual stability in contract terms. The clauses are ineffec-
tive because most companies choose not to insist on prompt
enforcement of the clause, but rather learn to live with the
changed terms. Any modification of the formal contract terms
occurs, if at all, months or even years after the government has
effectively made the changes. The Saudi Arabian government,
(Jan. 20, 1966) [hereinafter cited as "1966 Amendment"] (available at the offices of the
Fordham International Law Journal). The text of the stabilization clause in Libya, as
finally amended, provided:
(1) The Government of Libya will take all the steps necessary to ensure that
the Company enjoys all the rights conferred by this Concession. The
contractual rights expressly created by this concession shall not be al-
tered except by mutual consent of the parties.
(2) This Concession shall throughout the period of its validity be construed
in accordance with the Petroleum Law and the Regulations in force on
the date of execution of the agreement of amendment by which this par-
agraph (2) was incorporated into this concession agreement. Any
amendment to or repeal of such Regulations shall not affect the contrac-
tual rights of the Company without its consent.
Id. at 22.
61. See, e.g.,AminoilArbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1020 (1982) (text of Kuwait stabili-
zation clauses).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 33-44.
63. Under the 1971 Tehran Agreement, supra note 30, for example, price in-
creases through 1975 were to be limited to 5 cents per barrel per year, plus 2.5%
annually to compensate for inflation. P. TERZIAN, supra note 27, at 138.
64. See, e.g., P. TERZIAN, supra note 27, at 158. The Saudi Arabian participation
agreement of 1972, see id., for example, provided for a phasing-in of government
ownership to be completed in 1982. The Saudi Government's actual assumption of
full ownership was made without publicity and without a formal, signed agreement.
Zakariya, supra note 14, at 6 n.5.
65. See, e.g., infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 324-26.
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for example, did not sign a formal agreement validating its
100% ownership of the giant Aramco concession for a consid-
erable period after the government effectively assumed full eq-
uity ownership.6 7
3. De Facto Acquiescence
In a number of cases in which host governments have uni-
laterally imposed changes in contract terms on oil companies,
those companies have either continued to operate under the
revised terms, without any formal modification of their con-
tract,6s or have surrendered their concession rights without
making any claim against the government for compensation. 69
By continuing to operate after a host government unilaterally
changes the terms of the contract, an investor can be consid-
ered either to have consented to the new conditions or to have
waived any right it otherwise might have had under the origi-
nal agreement to challenge such unilateral change. v Thus,
Mobil's continued operations in Libya, even though under at
least informal protest, can be construed as a consent or
waiver.7
C. The History of Mobil's Contractual Relations in Libya
Mobil and the Libyan Government negotiated their origi-
nal oil exploration agreements in 1955.72 The terms of these
67. See Zakariya, supra note 14, at 6 n.5.
68. F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 326. Mobil itself, as a minority partner in the
Aramco oil concession in Saudi Arabia, apparently accepted the unilateral changes in
that concession agreement imposed by the Saudi Government. See Zakariya, supra
note 14, at 6.
69. Exxon, for example, surrendered its rights in Libya without making any
claim against the government. See Poor Economics, Not Politics, Spurs Exxon s Libya Exit,
PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Nov. 16, 1981, at 1.
70. See infra text accompanying note 143.
71. Id.
72. F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 83. The history of the petroleum industry in
Libya dates back at least to 1912, when scientific surveys conducted during the Italian
occupation revealed a "petroliferous odor" in many water wells. During the 1920s
and 1930s, considerable exploration was carried out by Italian, British and Egyptian
interests. Active drilling only began, however, following the enactment of the Petro-
leum Law of 1955, which was drafted with considerable assistance from the oil com-
panies. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE PETROLEUM RE-
SOURCES OF LIBYA, ALGERIA AND EGYPT 3 (1984). Forty-seven concessions were
granted in late 1955 and early 1956, and an additional 30 concessions were granted
from 1956 through 1958, altogether involving some 15 international oil companies.
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agreements were largely derived from the 1955 Petroleum
Law, which the government had drafted in order to attract for-
eign oil companies,73 and which was generally favorable to
such investors.7 4 Mobil made its first discoveries in 19597' and
began production by 1963.76
The parties first changed the pricing, stabilization and
choice-of-law terms of Mobil's concession agreements in
1963. 77 The 1963 amendments introduced the concept of
"posted prices,"78 which were defined as: "the price f.o.b.
[Libya] ... arrived at by reference to free market prices ... or
if there is no free market for commercial sales of full cargoes of
Libyan crude, then... a fair price fixed by agreement between
the [Company and the Ministry] or in default of agreement by
arbitration . . . . -7' This change brought Libyan practice into
conformity with that in most other OPEC states, where royalty
and tax payments were determined not by reference to prices
Ten oil fields were discovered before 1960, including the giant Amal field, located in
Mobil's concession area. Id. at 5. Crude oil production in Libya began in 1961 and
reached a peak level of 1.2 billion barrels in 1970. Since then, production has fluctu-
ated, and in 1982, the last year in which Mobil operated in the country, production
was only 316 million barrels, the lowest level since 1964. Based on the 1982 figures,
Libya is the 12th largest oil producer in the world and the 6th largest producer in
OPEC. Id. at 6. In 1984, Libyan production was 398 million barrels, ranking 13th in
the world as a whole and 7th in OPEC. 18 INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM ENCYCLOPEDIA
258-59 (1985).
The terms of the initial concessions were as prescribed in the 1955 Petroleum
Law. See F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 57-58. At the time the law was drafted, the
Libyan Government had no experience in oil taxation matters and no knowledge of
practice in other countries. The oil companies thus succeeded in obtaining what,
from their point of view, was an ideal contract, giving them virtually complete control
over all aspects of operations, as well as only minimal fiscal obligations. See id. at 69.
73. See id. at 60, 68.
74. Id. at 68-69.
75. Id. at 76.
76. Id. Prior to the discovery of oil, Libya was one of the world's poorest coun-
tries, with per capita annual income of less than U.S.$35 when Libya became in-
dependent in 1951. S. GHANEM, supra note 32, at xix. By 1968, per capita income
had increased to U.S.$1,239, and Libya was described as a case study in economic
development with an unlimited supply of capital. Id. In 1981, per capita gross na-
tional product was U.S.$8,450, or within 10% of that of the United States. See
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1983, 149 (1983).
77. 1963 Agreement, supra note 51.
78. For a discussion of Esso's introduction of posted prices in Libya, see S.
GHANEM, supra note 32, at 61-90.
79. 1961 Amendments, supra note 3, at 14. The 1963 agreement defined "posted
price" by reference to the 1961 amendments to the Petroleum Law. 1963 Agreement,
supra note 51, at 3.
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that the oil companies said they received in the marketplace,"
but rather to prices that were largely the result of negotiations
between the companies and the host governments.8
The 1963 amendment also changed the stabilization
clause by providing that no change in the Libyan petroleum
regulations that might be promulgated after the amendment
date would affect the rights of the concessionaire without the
latter's consent.8 2 Finally, the 1963 amendments altered the
choice of law clause in Libya's favor by adding, after "rules and
principles of international law ... 83 the phrase, "but only to
the extent that such rules and principles are not inconsistent
with and do not conflict with the laws of Libya."84 These
changes made it clear that, when Libyan law was relevant to a
contractual issue, Libyan law would apply, 85 and also permit-
ted the Libyan Government to change at least some laws with-
out infringing the contractual rights of the concessionaire.86
Mobil and the Libyan Government again amended the
concessions, by mutual agreement, in 1966.87 This amend-
ment gave the Libyan Government increased income by treat-
ing royalties primarily as a deduction from income, rather than
as a full credit against income taxes.88 In return, Mobil gained
somewhat stronger language in the stabilization clause " and a
complete revision of the choice of law clause. The new choice
of law clause provided that the governing law in any arbitration
was to be "the principles of law of Libya common to the princi-
ples of international law and in the absence of such common
80. The oil companies could manipulate such prices so as to maximize their
worldwide after-tax profits. See R. ENGLER, THE POLITICS OF OIL 41 (1961).
81. See, e.g., Tripoli Agreement, supra note 30.
82. 1963 Agreement, supra note 51, at 7-8.
83. Id. at 9.
84. Id.
85. F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 106. While the oil companies did not like the
change, no company filed for arbitration under this clause for 10 years. Id.
86. Id. at 108-09. In theory, the amended agreements permitted the govern-
ment to amend the Petroleum Law, but not the Regulations, without the concession-
aires' consent. In practice, however, the new agreements gave the companies the
most effective possible guarantee of stability. Id.
87. 1966 Amendment, supra note 60; see also F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 139-51
(describing the process of negotiation leading to passage of a new petroleum law in
1965 and the subsequent amendment of concession agreements).
88. See 1966 Amendment, supra note 60, at 5.
89. For the text of the revised stabilization clause, see supra note 60.
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principles then by and in accordance with the general princi-
ples of law, including such of those principles as may have
been applied by international tribunals." 90 In effect, this
amendment reversed the previous contractual scheme, in
which Libyan domestic law had been the primary source for
interpretation of the oil concessions, and instead made inter-
national law paramount.
In 1970, following the overthrow of the monarchy in Libya
by revolutionary military forces led by Col. Muammar Qad-
dafi, 9 ' Mobil and other oil companies operating in Libya
agreed to give up their dominant role in setting oil prices 92 and
to adhere to a schedule of periodic price increases intended to
govern the price situation until 1975. 9 3 Under the 1970-1971
agreements,94 prices were set by agreement in formal negotia-
tions, rather than declared unilaterally by either party.95
The next major change in relations between the Govern-
ment and the oil companies operating in Libya occurred in
1973-1974. In addition to the changes that resulted from
Libya's implementation of general OPEC policies96 concerning
prices, tax rates and equity interests for the government9 7 all
of which were implemented in Libya in 1973-1974, Libyan Law
No. 82 of 19749" gave the government the unilateral power to
determine posted prices. This law allows the government to
90. Id. at 25. The oil companies had encouraged the change in the governing-
law clause, which had at first been strongly resisted by the government. F. WADDAMS,
supra note 1, at 142. Eventually, the Libyan government accepted the new choice of
law provision as an indication of its intention to be fair and equitable. Id.
91. For an account of the 1969 military coup, see R. FIRST, LIBYA: THE ELUSIVE
RESOLUTION 99-118 (1974) and 0. EL FATHALY & M. PALMER, POLITICAL DEVELOP-
MENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LIBYA 38-41 (1980). The first Prime Minister of the
revolutionary government, Dr. Mahmud al Maghribi, had previously been a lawyer
for Exxon. In the first weeks after the revolution, no substantial change in oil com-
pany operations was anticipated. F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 229.
92. See Tripoli Agreement, supra note 30 (pricing arrangements negotiated by com-
panies and host government, rather than being set unilaterally by companies); see also
M. TANZER, supra note 32, at 125.
93. Tripoli Agreement, supra note 30.
94. These agreements are described in F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 233-45.
95. See, e.g., the complex pricing arrangements of the 1971 Tripoli Agreement.
F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 241-42.
96. See generally P. TERZIAN, supra note 27, at 163-202.
97. The 1971 Tehran agreement provided for a 55% tax rate, an initial increase
of 35 cents per barrel in posted prices, additional phased price increases, and a five-
year assurance of stability. F. WADDAMS, supra note 1, at 239-40.
98. Law No. 82, supra note 36.
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alter each concession agreement, without the concessionaire's
consent, by adding a new clause authorizing the Minister to set
prices "in the event of change in circumstances or basis for
determining the prices of crude oil or derivatives thereof in the
market.'"'9
From 1975 through 1982, Mobil and other companies
producing oil in Libya continued to operate under these new
terms even though the concessionaires had not explicitly
agreed to the unilateral setting of posted prices by the govern-
ment.' 00  Mobil evidently protested these unilateral
changes,' 0 ' but did not request a referral to arbitration under
the concession until the end of 1982, when Mobil simultane-
ously announced its withdrawal from the concession and its in-
vocation of the arbitration procedure.10 2
Late in 1981, the United States Government urged United
States oil companies to withdraw from Libya.'0 3 Mobil with-
drew at the end of 1982 without making any agreement with
the Libyan Government for the termination of the conces-
sion. ' 4 Shortly thereafter, the company filed an arbitration
claim alleging that Libya's actions with respect to the setting of
posted prices had deprived it of a fair return during the 1975-
99. Id. at 1.
100. See Libya, WORLD OIL, Aug. 15, 1984, at 118 (indicating that reduced opera-
tions by a number of companies were continuing).
101. In 1981, for example, Mobil temporarily halted production in a dispute
over pricing. Cowell, Libya Pressed to Revise Tough Oil-Price Poliy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23,
1981, at D2, col. 4.
102. Mobil did file a notice of intended termination early in 1982, Mobil Oil
Corp., news release (June 9, 1982) (available at the offices of the Fordham International
LaW Journal), but officially withdrew only at the end of that year. See MOBIL CORP.,
1982 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1983).
103. Mossberg, U.S. Is Boosting Effort to Isolate Libya's Qadhafi, Wall St.J., Dec. 8,
1981, at 4, col. 1. Exxon, the United States company with the largest Libyan produc-
tion, did withdraw. Friedmann, Exxon to End its Oil and Gas Output in Libya, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 13, 1981, at 1, col. 4. Other United States companies, however, includ-
ing Occidental and the Oasis Group, comprising Amerada-Hess, Conoco and Mara-
thon, stayed on in Libya. As of mid-1985, these companies were still producing in
Libya, although Occidental had sold a 25% share in its Libyan concession to an Aus-
trian firm. See Africa: Il'hen Illl the Pr-oblems End?, WORLD OIL, Aug. 15, 1985, at 110.
The remaining U.S. companies operating in Libya were ordered by the U.S. govern-
ment to cease operations by Feb. 1, 1986. See Weinraub, President Breaks All Econonic
Ties with the Libyans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1986, Al, col. 6, at A7, col. 1.
104. See Ibrahim, Libya Warns 11obil to Drop Claims or Face api Audit, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 26, 1984, at 42, col. 3.
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1982 period. 11 5 Mobil asserted that the Libyan actions in set-
ting posted prices unilaterally "destroyed the economic value"
of the concessions."' The primary reason for Mobil's claim
was the Libyan Government's attempt to capture 100% of any
increases in market prices for oil by increasing posted prices,
on which royalties and taxes were based, faster than market
prices.o 7
II. GOVERNMENT PRICE-SETTING AND THE
CONCESSIONAIRE'S RIGHT TO A FAIR PROFIT
Since the 1960s, resource-producing Third World states
have attempted to gain control of the mechanism by which
prices for their exports are determined. This attempt is a cen-
tral element in these governments' efforts to establish a "new
international economic order."'' 08 More specifically, since the
1970s, OPEC member states, including Libya, have asserted
their authority to set prices for the oil that they export.' 9
However, if prices that the governments set have the effect of
reducing corporate profits this price-setting action may lead to
conflicts between the host governments and the oil companies.
For some time after 1973, the higher oil prices set by
OPEC governments produced higher profits for the transna-
tional oil companies as well." ° During this period, there was
105. See Mufson, Mobil Pulls Out From Libyan Oil Fields, Saying Terms of 1955 Pact
il'ere Violated, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
106. MOBIL CORP., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1983).
107. At the post-1975 rates of 16.67% royalty and 65% income tax, the Libyan
government would theoretically obtain 70.81 cents for every dollar increase in the oil
price, assuming no corresponding increase in costs, in the form of an additional
16.67 cents in royalty, plus 65% of the remaining 83.33 cents. If, however, the gov-
ernment raised the posted price by $1.41 for each $ 1.00 increase in the market price,
then the government would capture the full $1.00 increase, taking 23.5 cents in roy-
alty (16.67 % of $1.41), plus 65% of the remaining $1.175. Oil companies generally
regarded Libyan crude prices fixed by the Government as being higher than justified
by market conditions. See Ibrahim, Libya ,light Cut Crude Oil Price by Sl, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 18, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
108. See generally LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER,
supra note 56.
109. See A. SAMPSON, supra note 26 at 255-59.
110. The return on total assets of crude oil and gas producing companies, for
example, increased from 6.3% in 1972 and 7.7% in 1973 to 11.6% in 1974. S. SUN-
DER, OIL INDUSTRY PROFITS 27 (1977). The pattern of oil company profits after the
1973-74 and 1979-80 price increases is graphically shown in CHASE MANHATTAN
BANK, FINANCIAL ANALYSIS OF A GROUP OF PETROLEUM COMPANIES 1983 (1984). For
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little incentive for the companies to challenge the new system
of price-setting, because the higher prices fixed by the govern-
ment coincided with higher profits reported by the companies.
This identity of interest between the companies and the oil-
producing states continued generally through the further oil
price increases of 1979-1980."' After 1980, however, as world
market prices for oil weakened," t 2 and OPEC began to lose its
commanding position in the world oil market," 3 the interests
of the companies and the governments diverged. The desire
of governments to maintain per-barrel revenues at as high a
level as possible meant that the posted or official selling
prices' 4 were set at levels that might reduce or eliminate oil-
company profits." 5
This growing divergence in host government and oil com-
pany interests is reflected in Mobil's argument that the com-
pany did not earn a "fair" profit or receive a "fair" price for its
oil." 6 Assuming that Mobil establishes that it had a contrac-
tual right to a fair profit, the company must then establish what
level of profit should be considered fair." 7 In view of the high
the large oil companies as a group, profits increased moderately in response to the
1973-74 price increases, then declined, but increased sharply following the 1979-80
price increases. Id.
111. The weighted average price of OPEC crude oil was $12.90 per barrel in
1978, $18.60 in 1979, $30.50 in 1980, and $34.30 in 1981. WORLD BANK, CoMMoD-
iTr TRADE AND PRICE TRENDS, 110 (1983-84 ed.).
112. Prices for some crude oils dropped from a high of more than $40.00 per
barrel in 1981 to barely $30.00 by the end of 1984. BRITISH PETROLEUM Co., B.P.
STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 12 (1985).
113. OPEC's production decreased from 31.5 million barrels per day in 1979, or
61% of non-Communist world production, to 18.3 million barrels per day, or 43% of
such total production, in 1984. Id. at 5.
114. During the period that the transnational oil companies controlled the sale
of most crude oil traded internationally, the relevant prices for government revenue
purposes were the posted prices, on which taxes and royalty were calculated. See A.
Sahakian, supra note 48, at 55. During the 1970s, host governments gradually took
over responsibility for marketing an increasing share of the oil produced in their
territory. For these governmental sales, the relevant prices, which determined the
ultimate government revenue, were the official selling prices quoted by government
oil companies or marketing agencies. See Tanzer & Zorn, supra note 32, at 37.
115. For an example of how this process would work in practice, see supra note
107.
116. This claim is based on the "fair price" language of the concession agree-
ment. See 1963 Agreement, supra note 77, at 6.
117. One leading analyst of the oil industry has suggested that:
There is no reason . . . why the oil companies should earn greater profits
than is necessary to induce them to continue investing in the country and to
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risk involved in oil exploration and production and the highly
volatile nature of oil prices,1 any attempt to specify an a pri-
ori level of fair profit appears to be highly speculative.
Whatever the level of a "fair profit" might be in the oil
industry, it is not clear that an investor may ever successfully
assert a claim against a government whose taxation decisions
effectively reduce the investor's profits. International prece-
dents indicate that, in the absence of specific contractual un-
dertakings or treaty provisions, governments are not generally
precluded from imposing taxation that may have had the effect
of depriving a foreign national of profitability." '9 Even when,
as in the United States, there are constitutional limits on the
government's ability to take property, 21 the amount of a tax
has rarely been held to be confiscatory. 1 2
However, in Government of the State of Kuwait v. American In-
dependent Oil Co.,112 an oil-industry arbitration case in which
such a stabilization clause was included in the concession
agreement, 1 3 the arbitrator indicated that the panel might
have reached a different result in a case involving a stabiliza-
compensate them for their initial risks. In other words, if excess profits are
to be earned, a producing country can complain of exploitation to the ex-
tent to which it is unable to obtain them for itself.
Penrose, Profit Sharing Between Producing Countries and Oil Companies in the Middle East, 69
ECON. J. 245 (1959).
118. Even before the large price increases of the 1970s, the posted price of Lib-
yan crude oil fluctuated between $2.55 and $3.34 per barrel, a difference of 31%. S.
GHANEM, supra note 32, at 301.
119. See, e.g., Kugele v. Polish State, 6 Ann. Dig. 69 (Upper Silesian Arbitral
Tribunal, 1932). Two cases decided by United States agencies suggest, however, that
taxation that is merely a disguised form of expropriation may violate international
law. See Corn Products Refining Co. Claim, 22 I.L.R. 333 (U.S. Int'l Claims Comm.
1955), in which the U.S. International Claims Commission held that the imposition
by Yugoslavia of a tax, in the form of a unilaterally imposed mortgage'in favor of the
state, equal to 1300% of average annual profits and three times the value of the
property in question, amounted to expropriation. Id. at 334; see also U.S. INT'L
CLAIMS COMM., I ITH SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR THE PERIOD ENDING
DEC. 31, 1959, 31-32 (1960) (reporting the Commission's decision that a Czechoslo-
vakian requirement that 80% of a real property owner's gross rental income be de-
posited with the government amounted to confiscation).
120. See U.S. CONST., amend. V.
121. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1980) (uphold-
ing 30% severance tax on coal).
122. Aminoil Arbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982).
123. The validity of the stabilization clause was upheld in the AminoilArbitration,
although the clause was held not to be specifically applicable to the nationalization at
issue in that claim. AminoilArbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1023 (1982).
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tion clause that applied unequivocally to the government ac-
tion at issue.' 24 The award in Aminoil failed either to define a
normal and reasonable level of profits, or to set out methods of
calculating profitability, required incentives, or measures of
compensation for risk.' 2 5 This award does not, therefore, pro-
vide a clear and definite guideline for application to other oil-
concession situations.
The only language relating to the fair-profit issue in the
Libyan concession agreements is the "fair price" provision. 126
This language was not specifically interpreted in the previous
Libyan arbitrations, 27 which dealt with outright nationaliza-
tions. There is a substantial question whether, in a high-risk
industry like petroleum exploration and production, the "fair
price" language can realistically be read to imply a guarantee
of fair profits. In view of the general uncertainty in the oil mar-
ket for much of the 1975-1982 period,' it would be difficult
to show that any particular prices were manifestly unreasona-
ble.
If the fair-price language alone will not support a claim for
breach of the concession agreement, Mobil might, alterna-
124. The arbitrator in the Aminoil Arbitration noted that:
[alssuming that a normal level of profits has been determined having regard
to the total capital invested, it would be ordinary business practice in the
case of a concession intended to last, to add a reasonable profit margin that
would preserve incentives, and allow for risks, whether commercial or tech-
nological.
AininoilArbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1038 (1982).
125. Between 1967 and 1973, overall rates of return on net assets of the ten
largest United States oil companies ranged from 11% to 15%. Rates of return on
foreign operations were generally more volatile than those on United States activi-
ties. Mobil's profitability in this period ranged from 10.3% to 15.6% on worldwide
operations (including the United States), and from 10.8% to 21.2% on non-United
States activities. Profits for almost all oil companies increased substantially in 1974,
following the 1973 OPEC price increases. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., 1975 PROFITABILITY OF SELECTED MAJOR OIL COMPANY OPERA-
TIONS 2-3 (Comm. Print 1976). More recently, the profits of 22 large oil companies,
including Mobil, in 1982-1983 were less than 6% of total assets and between 12-13%
of shareholders' equity. CHASE MANHATrAN BANK, supra note 110, at 24. No informa-
tion is available on the profitability of Mobil's operations in Libya; the company's
annual reports and SEC Form 10-K reports do not show Libyan activity separately.
126. 1963 Agreement, supra note 77, at 6.
127. LIAMJCO Arbitration, 62 I.L.R. 141 (1977); TOPCO Arbitration, 53 I.L.R. 389
(1977); B.P. Arbitration, 53 I.L.R. 297 (1974).
128. See WORLD BANK, supra note 111, at 110 (indicating the large variation in oil
prices in the 1972-1982 period).
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tively, argue that the basis of the entire contractual undertak-
ing, the reasonable expectation of the parties, 12') was that the
total effect of all fiscal arrangements, including royalties, taxes,
and prices, would allow Mobil to earn a reasonable profit. The
changes in the Libyan fiscal system may justify a concession-
aire's decision to withdraw from the concessions, because such
changes can be interpreted as a fundamental change of circum-
stances. 13 " However, it is doubtful that the fiscal changes
alone could support a claim for damages resulting from the
denial of a concessionaire's right to a fair profit, unless such a
claim stemmed from a stabilization clause in the concession
agreement.
III. EFFECT OF THE STABILIZATION CLA USE
The stability of contractual arrangements is a principal
concern of transnational corporations investing in oil and min-
ing ventures in developing countries.'13 ' In the absence of spe-
cific contractu'al language indicating the intention of the par-
ties, there is no general international legal obligation on the
part of a host government to permit foreign investors to make
a fair profit.' 2 However, when a concession agreement has
been negotiated on the basis of a shared understanding of the
range of likely profits, the agreement may oblige the govern-
ment to give the investor the benefit of the bargain that was
negotiated. If this position is accepted, such an obligation
would be based on the incorporation of the shared fiscal un-
derstanding into the substance of the concession agreement,
which would then become binding on the host government as
a result of the investor's legitimate reliance on the agree-
ment."' The investor in this situation could argue that, at a
minimum, the host government has some responsibility to ob-
serve the maxim pacta sunt servanda and to refrain from taking
129. See I A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 112 (1963).
130. See, e.g., lmiil,.trbitraion, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1044 (1982) (separate opinion of
Fitzmaurice, Arh.).
131. See Asante, supra note 54, at 409.
132. See, e.g., Kugele v. Polish State, 6 Ann. Dig. 69 (Upper Silesian Arbitral
Tribunal, 1932) (holding that taxation and license fees, even if they made a business
unrcmunerative, did not amount to a taking of property).
133. See l)olzer, New Foundations of /he Law of Exnopimliou of.-tlie Properl, 75 Am.
J. INT'l L. 553, 579 (1981).
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unilateral action that would deny the expected benefits to the
investor."'
A. The Libyan Stabilization Clause
In the Libyan case, this general argument for contractual
stability is reinforced by the specific stabilization clause con-
tained in the Mobil concession agreements.3 15 Libya's imposi-
tion of unilateral price-setting authority under Law No. 82s"
was, on its face, a violation of the stabilization clause's promise
that changes would be made only with the concessionaire's
consent.
In previous oil-industry arbitrations, stabilization clauses
have uniformly been upheld as valid self-imposed limitations
on the sovereignty of host governments.' :3 7 There is contrary
opinion, however, that when circumstances have fundamen-
tally changed after the date of the concession agreement,'38
the state can, by unilateral legislation, abrogate its prior com-
mitment to contractual stability and adjust the agreement to
the new situation.'' This view has not, however, generally
found favor with arbitrators.4 " Thus, an arbitrator might find
that the stabilization clause in the Libyan concessions retained
its validity through the 1975-1982 period. Identical clauses
have been upheld by arbitrators in the previous Libyan arbitra-
tions dealing with nationalization of oil concessions.1
4 1
134. The application of pacta sunt senanda,, the principle that agreements are to
be carried out according to their terms, to foreign investment contracts has been
recognized, e.g., in TOPCO .. rbitration, 53 I.L.R. 389, 462 (1982) and Sapphire Inter-
national Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136, 181 (Cavin, Arb.
1963).
135. See the text of stabilization clause supra note 60.
136. L.aw N'o. 82, stpra note 36, at 1.
137. See. e.g., TOPCO .-rbiation . 53 I.i..R. 389, 476-78 (1977).
138. The extent of the change required For a state to argue that the former con-
tractual arrangements should no longer apply is not necessarily self-evident. A lead-
ing proponent of the changed-circumstances doctrine, for example, does not attempt
to define exactly when that doctrine would apply in specific cases. See Zakariya, supra
note 56. at 264-65.
139. Id. at 274-75.
140. See. e.g...Amooil .4rbilration,. 21 1.1..M. 976, 1024 (1982) (finding a change in
the content of the parties' agreement, rather than changed circumstances).
14 1. See. e.g.. I. I- CO ..lrbitalwi . 62 I.L..R. 14 1, 170 (1977); TOPCO Arbitration,
53 I.L.R. 389. 477 (1977).
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B. Waiver, Estoppel and Modification
Despite the changes made by the Libyan Government af-
ter 1975, Mobil continued to operate in Libya through
1982.4"' This continuation of operations raises the issues of
waiver, estoppel, and possible modification of the concession
agreement by conduct.
Even if an arbitrator held that the stabilization clause re-
tained its vitality until Mobil's withdrawal from Libya in 1982,
the arbitrator could also find that the corporation had effec-
tively waived its rights or that it is estopped from claiming
damages. Both of these defenses could arise because Mobil
voluntarily chose to remain on the scene and to operate under
the unilaterally imposed terms for an additional seven years
after the first alleged breach of the contract by the govern-
ment. 4'
The waiver and estoppel arguments are Libya's most per-
suasive points in opposition to Mobil's claim. These argu-
ments are supported by analogy both from domestic United
States precedent and international law. The prevailing rule in
most United States jurisdictions'44 suggests that, unless a com-
pany can demonstrate that it objected consistently to the uni-
laterally imposed regime, and that it paid any taxes and royal-
ties resulting from the unilateral change only under protest, an
arbitrator might find that the corporation had waived any
claim. Such a conclusion appears to be especially likely after a
period of continued operation lasting as long as the seven
years that Mobil remained in Libya.' 45 An analogous rule of
public international law suggests that a state may be consid-
ered bound by general norms of international law unless it has
clearly registered its objections and taken consistent action to
preserve its status as a "persistent objector."'' 41
While Mobil did register some objections to the post-1975
142. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
143. See Aminoil Arbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1024 (1982).
144. See 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, §§ 390, 393 (2d ed. 1964).
145. See, e.g., Tibbetts Contracting Corp. v. 0. & E. Contracting Co., 15 N.Y. 2d
324, 206 N.E. 2d 340, 258 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (1965) (continued acceptance of benefits
under a contract with knowledge of breach constitutes a waiver).
146. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, in 106 RECEtTIL DES
COURS I, 49 (1962) (clear and unambiguous objection required, dating from the time
the objecting government first became aware of the objectionable rule).
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Libyan tax regime, 4 7 the corporation apparently did not take
any formal legal action to protest the imposition of the levies
until after its withdrawal at the end of 1982.48 Moreover, the
Libyan Government responded to some of the oil companies'
objections prior to 1982, by adjusting posted prices and grant-
ing discounts. 14 9 Such a pattern of continued operation and
negotiated compromises with the host government suggests
that Mobil and Libya had an ongoing contractual relationship,
in which any potential claims by the corporation, respecting
earlier government action, were either waived or eliminated as
the result of a de facto modification of the agreement. Such a
modification would occur when the parties' conduct indicated
that they recognized that their contract had effectively incorpo-
rated the government's unilateral changes. 50
C. Stabilization and Administrative Contracts
If the arbitrator considered the Libyan concession agree-
ments to be "administrative contracts,"' 5' the stabilization
clause would not necessarily determine the outcome of the ar-
bitration proceeding. Administrative contracts, a category of
agreements between states and investors, permit some unilat-
eral adjustment by the state. 52 Two of the three arbitrators
who have considered Libyan concession agreements that are
very similar to the Mobil agreement have concluded that these
147. See Mobil Oil Corp., news release (June 9, 1982) (announcing Mobil's in-
tention to withdraw from its Libyan concession).
148. See MOBIL CORP., 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1983) (announcing withdrawal
as of the end of 1982 and the filing of the arbitration claim).
149. See 15 INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM ENCYCLOPEDIA 98 (1982) (discount to
Occidental).
150. The decision of the arbitrators in the AminoilArbitration suggests that a con-
cession agreement may be modified by a course of conduct subsequent to the unilat-
eral action of one of the parties, although this finding was not essential to the holding
in that case. Aminoil Arbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1024 (1982).
151. Administrative contracts include: (a) contracts to which at least one party
is an administrative body and which have as their object the carrying out of public
works, (b) contracts providing for the occupation of public lands, and (c) contracts to
which one party is an administrative agency and in which either the obligations of the
other party include the carrying out of a public service or, if the public service aspect
is only an indirect object of the contract, there are provisions which impinge on what
would otherwise be common or public rights ("clauses exorbitantes du droit com-
mun"). M. WALINE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 565, 572 (9th ed. 1963).
152. Id. at 605-06.
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concessions are not administrative contracts.'5 "
However, even if an arbitrator did conclude that the oil
concession agreement was an administrative contract, there
are limits beyond which a government may not go in imposing
unilateral changes without incurring liability to the investor. 54
This is especially true when such adjustments significantly alter
the economic expectations of the parties. 155 If the Libyan Gov-
ernment's unilateral setting of posted prices deprived Mobil of
the profit that the concessionaire could reasonably have antici-
pated in the event of a successful exploration effort, then even
classifying the concession as an administrative contract would
not necessarily eliminate the government's liability.' 5" The
corporation's claim would, however, still be subject to the
waiver and estoppel defense.1 5
7
D. Stabilization: Remedies and Damages
Two further issues that relate to the stabilization clause in
the agreement are: 1) whether Mobil had a right to repudiate
its own contractual obligations and withdraw from Libya prior
to the end of the concession term'5 ' and 2) to what extent any
damage claim by Mobil could include lost future profits for the
period between the time Mobil actually withdrew and the
scheduled termination of the concession in the year 2011.
1. The Right of Withdrawal
In the Libyan case, Mobil chose "self-help" termina-
tion,15'" by withdrawing from the concession area and ceasing
153. LIAMCOArbitration, 62 I.L.R. 141, 169 (1977); TOPCOArbitration, 53 I.L.R.
389, 463-68 (1977). In the B.P. Arbitration, the arbitrator did find that the concession
agreement was an administrative contract, 53 I.L.R. 297, 327 (1974), but held that
Libya nonetheless breached the agreement by nationalizing the company's interests.
Id. at 355.
154. See L. NEVILLE BROWN &J. GARNER, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 129-30
(3d ed. 1983).
155. See M. WALINE, supra note 151, at 847.
156. See B.P. Arbitration, 53 I.L.R. 297, 327, 355 (1974).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
158. The original term of the concessions ran until the year 2011. See llhen Do
the Concessions End?, supra note 22, at 449.
159. That is, Mobil abandoned its operations under the concession prior to ob-
taining a judicial or arbitral judgment that Libya was in breach of its obligations. See
Ibrahim, Libya lWarns Iobil to Drop Claims or Face an Audit, Wall St.J., Sept. 26, 1984, at
42, col. 3.
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operations before obtaining an arbitral decision that the gov-
ernment breached the agreement. This approach was en-
dorsed by an arbitrator in the recent Aminoil arbitration. "'()
However, when a concessionaire decides to withdraw unilater-
ally, as in the Aminoil case, it takes the risk that an arbitrator
will subsequently find that the government did not commit a
material breach of the agreement or that the company had
waived any claims arising from any such breach. If the arbitra-
tor decides for the government, the concessionaire might itself
be liable for damages suffered by the government'(' as a result
of the withdrawal.
2. Damages for Lost Future Profits
Given the unpredictable nature of the international oil in-
dustry and the volatility of oil prices, 16' it would be difficult for
a company in Mobil's position to prove damages for hypotheti-
cal future profits. No previous international oil exploration
and production agreement arbitrations have awarded damages
for loss of future profits from ongoing operations,"' and, in
160. See Aminoil Arbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1044 (1982) (opinion of Fitzmaurice,
Arb.); see also Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co.. 35
I.L.R. 136, 182 (Cavin, Arb. 1963).
161. See, e.g., Kuwait's counter-claims in the Amitoil Arbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976,
1027 (1982). Such damages may include, for example, the cost of obtaining replace-
ments for the concessionaire's technical experts, and any loss on sales that would
have been made to the concessionaire.
162. See supra text accompanying note 118.
163. There are, however, numerous examples of awards for lost future profits in
other industries. See, e.g., Benvenuti et Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo,
21 I.L.M. 740, 759 (Int'l Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 1980); Pome-
roy v. Government of Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Claims Trib. Rep. 372, 386-87 (1983); Light-
houses Arbitration (Fr. v. Greece), 23 I.L.R. 299, 300-01 (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 1956).
Even in the oil industry, damages for lost future profits have not been awarded in
disputes concerning exploration and production concessions, but such damages have
been awarded with respect to contracts for the marketing and distribution of refined
products, which are not subject to the uncertainty associated with crude oil prices.
See AGIP Co. v. Popular Republic of the Congo, 21 I.L.M. 726, 738-39 (Int'l Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes 1979) (future profits recognized in principle,
but only a nominal amount awarded under this heading). While some crude oil ex-
ploration and production concession agreement arbitrations have accepted the theo-
retical possibility of an award in respect of lost future profits, see Sapphire Interna-
tional Petroleums Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136, 186 (Cavin, Arb.,
1963), no award of damages appears to have been made on the basis of an arbitra-
tor's attempt to calculate such lost profits. In the Sapphire case, damages were
awarded for the loss of concession rights even before any exploration had been car-
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view of the post-1982 depression in world oil prices,'" 4 the
measure of any such damages would be highly speculative.
IV. CREEPING EXPROPRIATION
While Mobil's arbitration claim characterizes the Libyan
Government's unilateral increases in posted prices '65 as a
breach of contract, these actions might also be seen as "creep-
ing expropriation." Such a claim would be based on the the-
ory that the Government's interference with the concession-
aire's rights was of such significance that it constituted a de
facto taking of Mobil's property.'6 6 Generally, an investor rais-
ing a claim of creeping expropriation will assert that the gov-
ernment continually harassed the investor or exercised regula-
tory control of the investor's operations to such a degree that it
deprived the investor of effective control. 167 Alternatively,
ried out; the arbitrator recognized that proof of the amount of potential lost future
profits was impossible. Id. at 187-88.
164. See supra note 112.
165. See supra note 107.
166. As early as 1926, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that
interference with a foreign investor's contractual rights could give rise to a claim for
the taking of property, even if no nationalization was involved. See German Interests
in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits), 1926 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7. Continual interference
with a concessionaire's freedom of action, sufficient to impair the concessionaire's
ability to operate profitably, has also been held to constitute a de facto expropriation.
Id. at 22.
Such de facto or creeping expropriations have also been found in more recent
cases, especially in developing-country mineral projects in which host governments
unilaterally imposed new taxes, levies or licensing requirements that substantially re-
duce the concessionaire's profits. See generally Higgins, The Taking of Property by the
State, in 176 RECEUIL DES CoURs 267, 322-54 (1983) (describing circumstances in
which state actions may amount to creeping expropriation). In several cases arising
from the imposition by Jamaica of a levy on bauxite production and export, such
taxation has been held to be the equivalent of creeping expropriation. See, e.g., Re-
vere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corp., 17 I.L.M. 1321,
1354 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1978).
While the Libyan government did not seize the physical assets of Mobil, it might
be argued that the unilateral setting of posted prices amounted to a taking of a con-
tractual right, i.e., the right to a "fair price," pursuant to Clause 8(5)(b) of the con-
cession agreement. 1961 Amendments, supra note 3, at 14. The taking of contractual
rights has frequently been held to be expropriation. See, e.g., Starrett Housing Corp.
v. Iran, [1984] Iranian Assets Litig. Rep. 7685, 7701 (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
1983); see also Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?, 38
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307 (1962).
167. See, e.g., the actions listed in S.P.P. (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, 22 I.L.M. 752, 760-61 (Int'l Chamber of Commerce Ct. of Arb. 1983) (revoca-
tion of land transfer, stop-work order, and sequestration of assets).
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some definitions of creeping expropriation require a pattern of
fiscal measures on the part of the government that destroys the
economic value of the concession. 1
68
In the petroleum industry, however, there is a global pat-
tern of government regulation and determination of produc-
tion rates and prices by government authorities. 169 Most gov-
ernments of petroleum-producing states exercise some unilat-
eral authority over oil-producing companies, through
conservation statutes 171 or fiscal legislation. 171 In the Mobil-
Libya dispute, if the concessionaire argued that Libya's actions
constituted creeping expropriation, Mobil would need to show
that the government's manner of regulation and control was so
different from the normal pattern in the industry that it consti-
tuted a true taking of property, and not mere regulation. In
view of both the unilateral price-setting authority assumed by
virtually all the OPEC governments during the 1970s,17 2 and
the production restrictions imposed on companies by many of
those governments, 73 such a claim would appear difficult to
sustain.
If, despite the preceding analysis, a claim for compensa-
tion for creeping expropriation were to be recognized by an
arbitrator in the Mobil-Libya situation, such a holding would
represent a significant expansion of the creeping expropriation
doctrine as previously applied. If the arbitrator bypassed pre-
vious standards for determining when creeping expropriation
had occurred, such as government harassment or measurable
economic loss, it is unclear whether a satisfactory new standard
for determining the existence of a creeping expropriation
could readily be devised.
168. See B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 106-09
(1959).
169. See K. HOSSAIN, supra note 22, at 245-46 (listing items normally regulated
by government).
170. Id. at 50-51. Such regulation applies even in the United States. See, e.g.,
RAILROAD COMM. OF TEXAS, STATEWIDE RULES FOR OIL, GAS AND GEOTHERMAL OPER-
ATIONS (1983) (detailed rules governing oil and gas operations in Texas).
171. K. HOSSAIN, supra note 22, at 52-54; see generally, G. Barrows, Changes in
World Exploration/Exploitation Terms (Address to Association of International Pe-
troleum Negotiators, Oct. 20, 1982) (description of current fiscal arrangements in
producing states) (available at the offices of the Fordham International Law Journal).
172. See supra note 34.
173. See generally A. SAMPSON, supra note 26, at 238 (example of the power of
producing countries to impose production restrictions on short notice).
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V. PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER
NATURAL RESOURCES
Both possible bases of Mobil's claim against the Libyan
Government, breach of contract and creeping expropriation,
arise from traditional norms of international law, which are
widely recognized to be based largely on Western legal con-
cepts. 7 4 In recent years, the continuing validity of many of
those norms has been challenged, principally in the series of
United Nations General Assembly resolutions dealing with
"permanent sovereignty over natural resources" 175 and with
the "New International Economic Order" (NIEO).' 7"
The substantive content of the permanent sovereignty
principle remains uncertain.' 77 At a minimum, the principle
recognizes that states own the natural resources within their
territory, and that they may dispose of those resources as they
see fit. 171 Some commentators would extend the principle fur-
ther, to include the right to nationalize natural-resource con-
cessions 17' and to adjust the terms and conditions under which
a concessionaire operates to meet changing circumstances.')
However, most commentators agree that the permanent-
sovereignty principle does not bar a government from freely
accepting self-imposed limitations on its powers that result
from contractual agreements with foreign investors. A similar
view has been taken by those arbitrators who have considered
the effect of the permanent-sovereignty principle.' 8 ' Thus, ab-
sent any contractual limitations, a government may be free to
174. See Anand, .titude ofAsian-African States toward Certain Problems of lnternational
Law, 15 INT'L & COMp. L.Q 55, 57 (1966).
175. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962); G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9400
(1973).
176. G.A. Res. 3201, S-6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559
(1974); see also G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50. U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974) (Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States).
177. Hossain, Permanent Sovereignty over \atural Resources, in LEGAt ASPECTS OF
THE NEW INrTERNATIONAL. ECONOMIC ORDER, 34 (K. Hossain ed. 1980). But see Gess,
Permauent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 13 INT'L & COM,. L.Q. 398. 448 (1964)
(identifying principles contained in Resolution 1803).
178. See Hossain, supra note 177, at 35.
179. Id. at 36-38.
180. See Zakariya, sn/ra note 56, at 264.
181. See, e.g., Aminoil Arbitration, 21 I.L.M. 976, 1021 (1982); TOPCO ..hbitration,
53 I.L.R. 389, 473-74 (1977).
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set export prices and control production. If that government
has previously agreed with a concessionaire to restrict its free-
dom of action in controlling prices and production, the gov-
ernment may be liable for damages if it subsequently breaches
the agreement.
The principles of the New International Economic Or-
der' 2 are similarly not fully defined in international law. The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,... the most
comprehensive and widely supported version of NIEO princi-
ples, provides that states may nationalize resource investments
in accordance with their own domestic legislation, and does
not refer to any international standard of compensation." 4
Nothing in this formulation, however, appears to bar a state
from freely undertaking the same kind of self-imposed limita-
tions which are generally permissible under the permanent-
sovereignty principle. A stabilization clause would, therefore,
appear to have some international legal effect notwithstanding
any invocation of the doctrine of permanent sovereignty or
principles of the NIEO.
Even if the substantive content of permanent sovereignty
or the NIEO could be determined, and if that content strength-
ened the host-government position in disputes like that be-
tween Mobil and Libya, it is not clear that these principles have
become established norms of international law.' 85 Any recog-
182. For a general summary of NIEO principles, see generally, Bulajic, Legal
Aspects of a New hIternational Economic Order, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 45-65 (K. Hossain ed. 1980).
183. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974) (Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States).
184. Id. § 2(2)(c).
185. See O'Keefe, The United Nations and Perimaoent Sovereign/vt Over .\atural Re-
sources, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 239, 245 (1974). United Nations General Assembly
resolutions are widely regarded as not being sources of international law in them-
selves. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2d ed. 1973);
J. CASTANEDA, THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 11 (1979); Fitz-
maurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Questiois of
Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure, 34 BRIT. Y.B. INT'I. L. 1, 3-5 (1958); Sloan, The
Binding Force of a Recommendationi of the General .4ssembly of the n'ited .Vations, 25 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1948). When a general Assembly resolution reflects an international
consensus, however, the text of the resolution may be regarded as a convenient ex-
pression of the current state of international custom. See R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAl. ORGANS OF TtIE UNITED NA-
TIONS 5 (1963). In the view of most commentators, only those resolutions that com-
mand support from all major groups of states, both geographic and ideological, can
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nition by an arbitrator of either permanent sovereignty or the
NIEO as enforceable legal principles would represent a signifi-
cant change in the generally recognized international law gov-
erning host governments and foreign investors.
CONCLUSION
Mobil's arbitration claim against the Libyan government
raises novel issues. Previous international arbitrations con-
cerning mining and oil investments have involved either na-
tionalization 86 or creeping expropriation.' 87 In the Mobil-
Libya dispute, there has been no actual nationalization, and
be regarded as having such a custom-declaring character. See Mendelsohn, The Legal
Character of General Assembly Resolutions: Some Considerations of Principle, in LEGAL As-
PECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 96-97 (K. Hossain ed. 1980).
Of the various General Assembly resolutions which embody the permanent-sover-
eignty principle, only resolution 1803, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), was adopted with the support of all the major
capital-exporting countries. Resolution 1803 was recognized by the arbitrator in the
TOPCO Arbitration as embodying customary rules of international law. See TOPCO Ar-
bitration, 53 I.L.R. 389, 491-92 (1977). The same arbitrator, however, held that sub-
sequent resolutions on permanent sovereignty, which commanded less than unani-
mous support from interested states, were at most de legeferenda. Id. at 493. Most of
the capital-exporting states either abstained or voted against these subsequent reso-
lutions. See, e.g., H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 8, at 466 (United States objec-
tions to General Assembly resolution 2158). Similarly, the resolutions on the NIEO,
G.A. Res. 3201, S-6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) (New
International Economic Order); G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at
50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States), also
appear to support the rights of resource-owning states to change the rules applicable
to foreign investors. See, e.g., art. 2 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, G.A. Res. 3281, which states that compensation for nationalization should be
determined in accordance with the domestic law of the nationalizing state and does
not refer to international legal standards. These resolutions, however, were adopted
only after a number of capital-exporting states voiced explicit reservations about
such an approach. Among the states opposing the nationalization language of G.A.
Res. 3201, for example, were the United States, the United Kingdom and West Ger-
many. See Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: a Reflection
or Rejection of International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295, 307 n.64 (1975).
In the TOPCO Arbitration, the Libyan Government attempted to invoke the per-
manent sovereignty, NIEO and Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States res-
olutions. See TOPCO Arbitration, 53 I.L.R. 389, 484 (1977). The arbitrator concluded,
however, that the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was not a part of
international law, id. at 492-93, and that the principle of good faith required that the
government perform its contractual obligations, notwithstanding the resolutions. Id.
at 494-95.
186. See, e.g., supra note 4 (Libyan arbitration cases cited therein).
187. See, e.g., Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment
Corp., 17 I.L.M. 1321 (Am. Arb. Ass'n 1978).
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the creeping-expropriation claim appears relatively weak."'
The case thus focuses primarily on breach of contract issues,
which have not often been addressed by arbitral tribunals in
natural resource concession cases that do not involve national-
ization or expropriation.
In practical terms, a determination of the validity of a
claim like Mobil's will generally turn on the facts of the specific
case. In particular, an arbitrator will be required to determine
the meaning of the language in the concession agreement re-
ferring to "fair" prices," 9 and whether there was also an im-
plicit contractual commitment to permit the concessionaire to
earn a fair profit.' 90 Even if an arbitrator found that the con-
cessionaire had a contractual right to a fair profit, he might
nonetheless determine that, over the entire period of the con-
cession prior to the government's unilateral action, the conces-
sionaire had earned such a fair profit. Most importantly, a con-
cessionaire's willingness to continue operations for several
years after the government's unilateral imposition of new con-
ditions can reasonably be said to amount to a waiver, estop-
ping the concessionaire from asserting a breach of contract
claim.
It is these traditional contract law arguments, and not new
legal theory regarding permanent sovereignty over natural re-
sources, or the New International Economic Order, that ap-
pear to control in a case like the Mobil-Libya dispute. When a
host government stops short of nationalization, the foreign in-
vestor must make a choice: either to withdraw promptly or to
continue operations and, in effect5, to accept the new rules of
the game. The investor cannot continue to operate under the
new rules while they remain satisfactorily profitable, and then,
after an extended period of such operation, shift its position
and argue that it is entitled to damages dating back to the time
of the initial change in the rules. From the point of view of
developing countries, this analysis suggests that, even when a
concession agreement has been "internationalized," the for-
eign investor may be held subject to new rules imposed by the
188. See supra text accompanying note 169-73.
189. See 1963 Agreement, supra note 77, at 4.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 116-25.
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government, at least in situations in which the investor wishes
to keep operating in that state.
Stephen A. Zorn
